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POST-9/11 MEDIA COVERAGE OF TERRORISM
Abstract
Media coverage of terrorist attacks plays an important role in shaping the public 
understanding of terrorism. While there have been several studies analyzing coverage of 
terrorist incidents prior to 9/11, there has been little research examining post-9/11 
coverage. This study fills this gap by examining the media’s coverage of terrorism in the 
United States between the dates of September 12, 2001 and December 31, 2015. The 
analysis is based on a list of terrorist-related incidents and New York Times articles 
written on each incident. This study documents the amount of coverage received by these 
incidents and identifies the variables influencing whether an incident is covered and how 
much space it receives. It also provides a qualitative analysis of coverage of the top 15 
most news producing incidents. The results follow a similar pattern to pre-9/11 findings, 
where most terrorist incidents receive no coverage and a select few are sensationalized. 
Incidents with casualties or injuries, Jihadi perpetrators, governmental targets, or firearms
are significantly more likely to be covered and receive more news space. Additionally, 
qualitative analysis indicates that coverage of Jihadi incidents tends to present them as 
international even when the perpetrators are domestic.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In contrast to other forms of crime, a terrorist attack that goes unnoticed by the 
media is often an abject failure. Although such acts cause great harm to their primary 
victims in and of themselves, the intent is usually to convey a message to a larger group, 
with the primary victims merely serving as symbolic representatives. Thus, the media 
response to a terrorist act plays an integral role by reporting on the attack in more detail 
than would otherwise be available to anyone without a direct experience of it. 
Unfortunately, coverage of this sort can have a harmful emotional impact on media 
consumers (Keinan, Sadeh, & Rosen, 2003; Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Slone, 2000; 
Wicks, 2006). In light of this, the media’s framing of terrorist attacks has been heavily 
criticized for its role in adding to the fear and confusion that the attacks were designed to 
spread (Bassiouni, 1981; Schmid, 1989). A further concern is the possibility that media 
coverage skews the perception of terrorist attacks in a manner that magnifies their impact.
If the news paints an accurate picture of the full spectrum of attacks, then their 
culpability is limited: while it could be argued that they assist the spread of anxiety by 
providing unnecessary detail to the general public, the attacks themselves would still be 
the ultimate source of such feelings. However, if the media’s framing of terrorism differs 
substantially from reality, false perceptions of terrorism could lead to additional stress.  
For instance, if news coverage focuses primarily on attacks with larger body counts, the 
public would have an inaccurate perception of the lethality of terrorist incidents, leading 
to greater perceptions of danger. 
The impact of misleading coverage can be far reaching. Mass panic fueled by 
sensationalist journalism can have a profound impact on public policy. Much of the 
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criminal justice policy of the 1990s was motivated by a fear of “superpreadators”, 
supposed juvenile sociopaths described in an alarmist article in the Weekly Standard 
(Dilulio, 1995). Despite being in the middle of a steep decline in crime rates, politicians 
passed increasingly harsh legislation to crack down on a problem that did not exist, 
leaving a lasting impact on the prison system (Tonry, 1999). Similarly, while terrorism is 
certainly a legitimate threat, it seems likely that counterterrorism policy is based more on 
public fears than it is on actual data: resources are focused on the forms of terrorism that 
are in the public eye rather than those that are actually common. It is too soon to know 
for sure, but it is possible that these polices will have similarly disastrous outcomes. 
Given the importance of counterterrorism policy based on accurate data, it is vital 
to understand the extent to which the media framing of terrorism within the United States
differs from reality. Unfortunately, the existing analyses are limited. While there are 
thorough analyses of the media frames prior to 9/11 (e.g., Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006;
Weimann, 2005), post 9/11 studies have focused on coverage of specific incidents, 
organizations, or individuals (e.g., Nagar, 2010; Powell, 2011; Ross & Bantimaroudis, 
2006). There is a great need for a study that explores how the media framing of terrorism 
in the United States has shifted in the 15 years since 9/11.
The current study aims to contribute to this body of knowledge by exploring a set 
of research questions:
1. What factors determine the level of media coverage an incident of terrorism in the
United States gets?
2. How has media coverage of terrorism changed since 9/11?
3. How does the media framing of terrorism differ from reality?
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These questions will be explored with the using data from Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) that includes American terrorist incidents since 1970 (LaFree & Dugan, 
2007). The database uses open source material to compile detailed information on the 
incidents, their victims, and when identifiable, their perpetrators. By cross-referencing the
GTD with news archives, this study will determine which attacks receive more coverage.
The next chapter will define the concepts and theories at the core of this study.  
Chapters three and four will then provide an examination of the research on the impact of
terrorism coverage and biases within the media’s narrative. This will be followed by a 
presentation of the methodology and findings of this study. This study will then conclude 
with an analysis of the results and a discussion of their implications on media coverage, 
terrorism, and public policy.
Chapter 2: Definitions and Theories
Terrorism
There is little consensus on a single definition of terrorism, as the label of has 
become strongly politicized. The scope of the term is hotly debated in international 
discourse, as no nation is willing to agree to a definition that includes groups they support
or fails to include ones they oppose. Even within the American government, different 
organizations use varied definitions depending on their objectives and jurisdiction. The 
FBI definition states that “Terrorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 C.F.R. § 
0.85). On the other hand, the State Department uses a different definition: “the term 
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‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (22 U.S.C. § 2656f).
Within academia, there is only marginally more consistency. No single definition 
is universally supported, although here have been multiple attempts to develop a 
consensus based on shared elements across scholarly definitions (Schmid, Jongman, & 
Stohl, 1988). Schmid proposed a definition incorporating 16 of these definitional 
elements: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, 
or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative 
or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat—and violence—based communication processes between terrorist 
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main target (audiences(s)), turning it into 
a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (1988, p. 28)
This definition is thorough, but may be almost too comprehensive for some 
purposes. By including so many different elements, it becomes inherently inflexible. Real
incidents are more likely to meet a portion of these elements than all of them. There is a 
risk that this definition would exclude incidents that would be considered terrorism by 
media or the general public. In many circumstances, this would not be a problem, but as 
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this study is particularly concerned with these groups, a more permissive definition is 
needed.
To address these concerns, this study uses the criteria for inclusion in the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015) as the basis for its 
definition. The GTD’s criteria include many of the same elements as those found in 
previous definitions. An incident is an act of terrorism if it is an intentional act 
incorporating violence or the threat of violence perpetrated by sub-national entities. 
Beyond this core definition, the GTD uses a set of three supplemental criteria; an incident
must meet at least two to be considered an act of terrorism: (1) the act serves a social, 
political, religious, or economic goal, not including the acquisition of profit; (2) is  
intended to convey a message to an audience beyond the intended victims; and/or (3) is 
outside the bounds of the rules of war, particularly the rules barring the targeting of 
civilians and other noncombatants.
This definition includes the elements of previous definitions, while allowing for 
incidents that only meet a portion of these elements. For example, it would include the 
suicide bombing of an active US military base by an insurgent group, even though the 
target could not be considered noncombatant, if the attack was politically motivated and 
intended to send a message to the American public.
Although this study focuses primarily on incidents that occurred on US soil, the 
distinction between international terrorism and domestic terrorism remains important. 
Incidents of domestic terrorism are those which occur within the territory of the United 
States, while international terrorism either occurs outside the US, or transcend national 
boarders in terms of the methods, targets, or base of operations. (18 U.S.C. § 2331). An 
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attack within the United States can therefore be considered international terrorism if it is 
carried out by foreign entities or the means by which it was accomplished extend beyond 
our borders.  For the purposes of this study, the primary concern in distinguishing 
between domestic and international incidents is that international incidents involve 
foreign entities crossing US boarders as part of the attack, while domestic incidents are 
carried out by individuals or groups based within the US.
Media
The label of “media” is used to refer to a broad variety of concepts, often with the 
assumption that the meaning of the term is understood. The term can be used to refer to 
any form of communication, regardless of sender, audience, message, or channel, but 
what is generally meant is some concept of mass communication. In an attempt to clarify 
the concept of mass media, Potter (2013) took definitional elements from existing studies,
weeded out elements that were too specific, general, or otherwise lacking, and 
synthesized the remainder into the following criteria:
The sender is a complex organization that uses standardized practices to 
disseminate messages while actively promoting itself in order to attract as many 
audience members as possible, then conditioning those audience members for 
habitual repeated exposures. Audiences members are widely dispersed 
geographically, are aware of the public character of what they are seeing or 
hearing, and encounter messages in a variety of exposure states but most often in 
a state of automaticity. Channels of message dissemination are technological 
devices that can make messages public, extend the availability of messages in 
time and space, and can reach audiences within a relatively short time. (p. 1)
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The message communicated by mass media outlets can take a variety of forms, 
but this study is chiefly concerned with the media's role as a news provider. Much of the 
media's content consists of either news reports or commentary. In this respect, mass 
media plays a dual role for many audiences: providing both informative content detailing 
current events and editorial content analyzing the events.
The mass media makes use of a variety of channels, such as Internet, television, 
radio, or newspapers. These channels are not independent of each other, as a single news 
outlet may utilize multiple platforms. In particular, it is increasingly common for an 
outlet to have an Internet presence in addition to a television network or newspaper (Lu 
& Holcomb, 2016). In these cases, the digital source generally provides much of the same
content as the network or paper. While this study focuses primarily on print media, the 
impact of television sources are important as well. In fact, much of the existing research 
on the impact of terrorism coverage explores reactions to televised news (Keinan et al., 
2003; Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Slone, 2000; Slone, Shoshani, & Baumgarten-Katz, 
2008).
Another key distinction between media outlets is their scope: while many outlets 
cover national or even international news, others operate on smaller scale. Existing 
research on news media has focused primarily on national outlets. It could be argued that 
local newspapers cannot even be considered mass media, by the definition previously 
stated: their audiences are generally geographically confined to the region they cover. In 
addition, many local papers obtain a significant amount of content from a wire service, 
such as Reuters, printing it with minimal edits. This further limits the individual impact 
of such outlets, as many smaller papers will be running essentially the same articles. 
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National news outlets, on the other hand, are more influential, reaching a wide audience 
and potentially framing the issues for both other outlets and the general public.
Media Effects Theory: Agenda Setting and Media Framing
The underlying theoretical framework of this study is that the message the media 
presents has an effect on its audience. There are two theoretical models detailing this 
process: agenda setting and media framing (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Agenda 
setting refers to a correlation between the media’s emphasis of an issue and the 
importance placed on it by the public. Media focus on a topic increases the salience of the
topic in the public eye, increasing it’s role in political attitudes and judgments.
Media framing theory goes a step further. Not only does the media guide public 
awareness of issues, it shapes the frame of reference surrounding the issues (Scheufele, 
1999; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Any given issue can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives and framed in terms of a variety of different values: mass shootings can be a 
gun control concern or a mental health concern; police brutality can be a racial problem 
or a matter of public order. Everyday decisions are made by the staff on which stories to 
run, which facts and values to emphasize, and what stance to take in editorial content to 
shape the media frame, the narrative the news provides to link events together and 
highlight issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
The media frame in turn shapes individual frames, the network of ideas we use to 
interpret information (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele, 1999).  Individual frames 
are not generally direct copies of the media frames: there are a number of factors that 
moderate the process, including strength of prior opinions and knowledge (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007). Often, individual frames mix elements of multiple media frames (Edy 
& Meirick, 2007). Nonetheless, media frames have a clear influence on individual 
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frames. For example, tolerance for the KKK is higher when the news frames their rallies 
in terms of free speech and lower when the frame emphasizes public order instead 
(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). This does not necessarily mean that the media 
deliberately manipulates audiences with a misleading story. Rather, framing is a tool by 
which complex issues and events can be fit into existing narratives in order to make them 
accessible to the general public.
Through these processes, the media can both focus the public on the issue of 
terrorism and shape its understanding of the topic. In many cases, the media may only be 
reinforcing existing frames in individuals, but the impact on the public as a whole must 
be understood.
Chapter 3: The Impact of Terrorism Coverage
Individual Response to Coverage
While some people have been unfortunate enough to experience a terrorist attack 
firsthand, the rest of the world has only an indirect experience. Although the aftermath of 
the most severe incidents can be widespread, the general public only experiences the 
attack itself through media coverage. As a result, reactions to an act of terrorism are often
simultaneously reactions to the coverage of the act. It can be difficult to differentiate the 
impact of media coverage of terrorism from the impact of the attacks themselves, but at 
minimum, the media serves to spread the impact of the attacks.
For instance, there is a strong consensus that exposure to coverage of terrorist 
incidents results in anxiety (Keinan et al., 2003; Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Slone, 2000; 
Slone et al., 2008). Given that terrorist attacks themselves are inherently stressful, it is not
surprising that indirect exposure would cause some level of anxiety. Detailed coverage is 
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perhaps too effective at transmitting the anxiety of the incidents: the responses to such 
coverage have been likened to symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Keinan et 
al., 2003). Such symptoms may be a result of existing trauma, as they are heightened in 
individuals with personal experience of political violence, but those without such trauma 
still show some level of anxiety (Slone et al., 2008). Other factors affect the response as 
well: gender (Keinan et al., 2003; Slone, 2000), religiosity, dogmatism (Slone, 2000), and
preference for seeking out or avoiding threatening information (Keinan et al., 2003). 
Clearly, the anxiety resulting from exposure to terrorism coverage is as much a result of 
personal factors as it is the coverage itself, but it is still clear that the coverage spreads the
stress of the attack beyond the incident itself.
Terrorism coverage tends to inspire a mix of other emotions and attitudes as well, 
regarding both the acts themselves and the media’s framing of them. In general, the 
coverage tends to inspire feelings of anger (Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Wicks, 2006), 
although the target of such feelings can vary. More often than not, hostile emotions are 
directed at the perpetrators.  These feelings seem to be intrinsic to the coverage. 9/11 
coverage, for instance, inspired a rage in national viewers not found in New Yorkers with 
a more direct experience of the attack (Strozier, 2011). These feelings seem to affect the 
way the perpetrators are viewed. In Israel, coverage of terrorist attack promotes not only 
anger in many Israelis, but also negative stereotypes of Palestinians and increased 
perceptions of the enemy’s hostility (Shoshani & Slone, 2008).
Some, however, find the media’s coverage itself to be objectionable, as they feel 
that it provides an unnecessary amount of detail and images (Keinan et al., 2003).  Others
take issue with the media framing, particularly of Islamic terrorism: Muslim audiences 
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tend to take issue with a media narrative that portrays their religion as barbaric and 
patriarchal, while others recognize that the media is sensationalizing the stories to boost 
ratings (Wicks, 2006).  Regardless of the reaction to such coverage, though, a large 
number of people continue to express a desire for it, even if they are not quite prepared 
for the most horrifying of details (Keinan et al., 2003).
To some extent, the reaction to televised media may be more extreme than the 
reaction to print media. Not only was televised coverage of 9/11 itself more emotional, it 
provoked a stronger emotional response in its audience (Cho et al., 2003). There are a 
number of possible explanations for this disparity. Televised coverage updates in real 
time, often covering stories as they happen, accompanied by footage of the incident. 
Newspapers, on the other hand, report on stories after the fact, providing, at most, still 
images. The result of these factors is that television is a “hotter” medium than print: it 
engages more of the senses, requiring less imagination on the part of the audience 
(Strozier, 2011). This should not be taken to mean that only televised coverage of 
terrorism has an impact. While the immediate impact of print media may not be as 
extreme as that of television, both can have a significant long-term impact.
Long-Term Impact
The impact of coverage extends beyond individual reactions.  Media coverage 
influences the public understanding of terrorism overall.  A key part of this process is the 
idea of a moral panic. Society periodically focuses on a group or phenomenon as a grave 
threat: the media presents a narrative that enhances stereotypes through sensationalism, 
authority figures demonize the deviant behavior, policy makers propose heavy handed 
solutions, and eventually the problem either resolves on its own or society becomes 
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accustomed to its presence (Cohen, 2002). The role of the media in creating a moral panic
is well documented: media coverage promotes fear of a deviant behavior, inspiring an 
outcry for an official response that may or may not be justified (Altheide, 2006; Cohen, 
2002). Many of the harshest anti-crime regulations of the 1990s, such as three-strikes 
laws or mandatory minimum sentencing, can be linked to a moral panic: the media and 
the political right continued to fuel public fears of crime even as crime rates fell (Tonry, 
1999).
Moral panic may play a part in the public’s understanding of terrorism. This is not
to suggest that terrorism is not a serious problem in need of a response.  However, the 
sensationalism of terrorism coverage does at times seem to be designed to inspire fear 
(Altheide, 2006, 2009). The coverage in the months following 9/11 is a perfect example, 
as the news explored detailed scenarios of anthrax attacks and other forms of biological 
and chemical warfare, sparking a panic far beyond what the actual likelihood of such 
attacks justified (Nacos, 2003). The most cynical view would be that it is a political tool, 
ensuring that oppressive policies that would otherwise have been opposed are supported 
in the name of national security, although it may simply be a  simply a ploy for ratings 
and money (Altheide, 2006, 2007).  
Intentional or not, such coverage has a lasting impact. The feelings of rage fueled 
by coverage of  9/11 made it easy for politicians to gather support for military 
intervention in the Middle East (Strozier, 2011). The media generally presented two 
frames for the attacks: the attacks were most commonly presented in the context of an act
of war, but were also presented as a crime (Edy & Meirick, 2007). Rather than picking 
one or the other, many viewers adopted a mixed frame: the victims of the attack were 
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murder victims, not war casualties, but the perpetrators should be killed in battle. This 
“vengeance” frame categorized the victims as individuals, but the perpetrators as a group,
and was associated with even stronger support for a military response than a frame that 
viewed the attack purely in the context of war (Edy & Meirick, 2007).
Furthermore, sensationalist coverage of the kind found in the months following 
9/11 can make media outlets unwitting accomplices to the terrorists’ cause. Terrorism is 
somewhat theatrical in nature, in that it is intended to reach an audience and many details 
of an attack are carefully scripted to maximize impact (Weimann, 2005).  Many terrorist 
organizations use a variety of tactics to manipulate media response to facilitate the spread
of their message (Galily, Yarchi, Tamir, & Samuel-Azran, 2016). High profile targets 
such as the Boston Marathon attract a large amount of media attention on their own, 
magnifying the impact of incidents targeting them to the point where the fear of an attack 
hangs over future events  (Galily et al., 2016).  After the incident, terrorists can continue 
to fuel the coverage by interacting with the media themselves, using press releases, films,
and interviews to hold the media’s attention (Surette et al., 2009; Weimann, 2005).
However, the media has also shown some restraint. Due to a longstanding policy 
of not showing anyone at the moment of death, the US network ABC made the decision 
not to air any footage of people jumping or falling to their death during the 9/11 attacks, 
and encouraged other networks to do the same (Strozier, 2011). The media seems to have 
held to this standard, not airing ISIS propaganda depicting public executions. Yet it is 
unclear if this restraint has any effect. Victims falling or jumping to their deaths has 
become a key element of the 9/11 narrative despite the media’s diligence.  More broadly, 
it is not necessary for the media to show such footage for it to have an impact. The impact
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of a terrorist attack often comes not from the gruesome reality of the attack itself, but 
from the fear and uncertainty of its aftermath. Newspapers speculating about anthrax 
attacks (Nacos, 2003) or the safety of sporting events (Galily et al., 2016) spread the 
terrorist’s message of fear without even a still image of a body.
Ultimately, it is clear that the media’s framing of terrorism contributes to the fear 
the attacks cause, influencing policy and furthering the terrorists’ cause.  For this reason, 
it is vital to understand the specifics of the media frame.
Chapter 4: Biases in Media Frames
The media does not have the resources to report on every single crime. News 
space is limited, and while muggings may be violent crimes, they are non-fatal and 
relatively common; they do not draw an audience in the same way that a rarer crime such 
as homicide does.  Unfortunately, this tendency to focus on the rarer crimes leads to a 
media frame that diverges from reality: the frame overemphasizes homicides with white 
female victims and overlooks minority victims (Johnstone, Hawkins, & Michener, 1994; 
Paulsen, 2003; Sorenson, Manz, & Berk, 1998; Weiss & Chermak, 1998), despite actual 
crime statistics skewing in the opposite direction (Sorenson et al., 1998). This media 
frame shapes audience frame that views the rarest crimes as the most common; the public
develops a false understanding of risk factors surrounding homicides, and a fear of crime 
that does not reflect actual crime rates.
The media’s framing of terrorism is equally misleading. The majority of terrorist 
incidents receive little to no coverage: between 1980 and September 10, 2001, 15 
incidents accounted for 71% of all New York Times articles on specific terrorist incidents, 
while 85% of incidents were mentioned in less than five articles (Chermak & 
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Gruenewald, 2006). The primary factors guiding media attention were the severity of the 
attack, the target and tactics used (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Weimann & Brosius, 
1991), and the perpetrator’s identity (Weimann & Brosius, 1991). The fact that these 
factors remained prominent over multiple decades suggests some consistency in the 
media’s priorities, leading to this study’s first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Severity of attack, tactics used, target, and perpetrator identity 
remain key factors in determining the level of media coverage an incident gets. 
Although these factors are consistent, the specific preferences within the media 
vary over time. In the decades prior to 9/11, the media shifted from emphasizing attacks 
that resulted in injuries (Weimann & Brosius, 1991) to those resulting in fatalities 
(Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006).  Stories focused on hostage-taking (Weimann & 
Brosius, 1991) and hijackings (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006), with attacks targeting 
airlines receiving high amounts of coverage as well (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; 
Weimann & Brosius, 1991).  A particular focus was placed on domestic terrorists, as 
attacks on US soil received more coverage if they originated within our borders 
(Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). As was the case with homicides, the media was actually
focusing on the more unusual cases: 93 percent of attacks had no fatalities, airlines only 
comprised 8.3 percent of targets, and 63.6 percent of attacks were bombings, far beyond 
either hijacking or hostage situations (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). This discrepancy 
suggests a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The more common an attack characteristic is in reality, the less 
media attention it receives, and vice versa.
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Following 9/11, the media frame appears to have shifted again. In 2002, the frame
was in a state of flux: while the government stance painted the Middle East as a hotbed of
terrorism, media portrayals of Middle Eastern leaders were inconsistent even within a 
single paper (Ross & Bantimaroudis, 2006).  However, limited analysis suggests that the 
frame has solidified since then: a study of specific incidents suggests that the media was 
quick to label perpetrators as Muslim and suggest a potential link to Al-Qaeda (Powell, 
2011).Interestingly, the study suggested that the media tended to treat domestic attacks as 
isolated incidents carried out by troubled individuals, while international terrorism was a 
part of a war on America carried out by Islamic extremists, in contrast to the focus on 
domestic terrorism prior to 9/11. These shifts in the specifics of the media’s framing of 
terrorism lead to the study’s third and fourth hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The specific tactics, targets and perpetrators that receive the most 
coverage have changed since 9/11.
Hypothesis 4: Incidents receive more coverage if their perpetrators can be tied to 
international organizations, particularly Jihadi extremists.
To test these hypotheses, this study will conduct a content analysis of New York 
Times coverage of terrorist attacks on US soil since 9/11. The New York Times was 
selected due to its substantial readership, with a total average circulation of 655,343 as of 
2015 (“The Times Sees Circulation Remain Steady in Fourth Quarter of 2015,” 2016), its 
prominence in previous analyses (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006), and its influence on 
both its readers and on other papers (Weiss & Chermak, 1998). Together, these 
hypotheses describe how the media’s framing of terrorism has shifted since 9/11, and 
how it fails to present an accurate picture of the reality of terrorism.
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Chapter 5: Methods
The purpose of this content analysis is to examine the factors that influence the 
level of coverage a post-9/11 terrorist attack gets in the New York Times. The study’s 
chief concerns are whether an incident received any coverage in the New York Times at 
all and, if it was covered, the number of articles covering the attack. This study will use a 
mix of regression techniques to determine what factors are associated with the level of 
coverage.
Sample
This study was designed using terrorist incidents taken from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) and articles from the New York Times’ digital archive. The GTD’s 
inclusion criteria are as previously stated, with the addition that incidents require 
independent verification from at least two sources for inclusion in the database.
Incidents were obtained from the GTD using a criterion sampling method: all 
incidents that occurred within US borders between September 12, 2001 and December 
31st, 2015 were included in the study. At the time of analysis, incidents from 2016 had 
not yet been added to the database. This sampling method initially produced 280 
incidents. However, linked attacks were merged into a single incident. Incidents were 
considered to be linked if they were closely related enough that coverage of them could 
not be separated. 221 incidents were left after merging.
These incidents were coded along seven different categorical independent 
variables. The categories of each variable are listed in Table 1 along with the number of 
incidents in each category. For each variable, the largest category was used as a reference 
category. Outcome of incident was treated as a binary variable: an attack was considered 
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successful if its immediate goals were met, regardless of its lasting effects. For instance a 
bombing was successful as long as the bomb was set off, regardless of whether anyone 
was caught in the blast. The region of the incidents was coded based on census 
designations. Seriousness of an incident was measured by victim fatalities and injuries, 
both of which were treated as binary variables. Origin of incident was coded as a binary 
variable, where incidents in which perpetrators crossed US boarders to commit the 
incident were as international and incidents carried out by individuals radicalized within 
the US were considered to be domestic. Incidents with unknown perpetrators were 
considered to be domestic, due to the unlikelihood of groups or individuals crossing US 
boarders to commit an attack without either getting caught or deliberately calling 
attention to themselves.   As many incidents were carried out by unaffiliated individuals, 
perpetrator identity was measured by the ideological motive of the attack. In addition to 
explicit statements of intent, classification of motive took into account implicit indicators 
of intent including target of attack and signifiers of ideology, such as swastikas, left 
behind at scene. Target and Weapon were  coded based on GTD classifications. Tactical 
classification were defined as follows. Facility/infrastructure attacks include attacks 
primarily intended to cause damage to non-human targets; bombings attempt to harm 
people directly with the use of explosives; armed assaults target people with use firearms,
incendiary devices, or sharp implements, and unarmed assaults include incidents intended
to harm people with any other weapon, including chemical, biological, or radiological 
weapons.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents in Sample (N=222)
Variable (Coding) N Percent of all incidents
Outcome
Successful (0)1 184 83.3
Unsuccessful (1) 37 16.7
Region
West (0)1 102 46.2
South (1) 52 23.5
Midwest (2) 38 17.2
Northeast (3) 26 11.8
Multiple (4) 3 1.4
Seriousness – Deaths
No Deaths (0)1 194 87.8
Deaths (1) 27 12.2
Seriousness – Injuries
No Injuries (0)1 190 86
Injuries (1) 31 14
Origin
Domestic (0)1 213 96.4
International (1) 8 3.6
Apparent Motive
Far Left (0)1 86 38.9
Far Right (1) 82 37.1
Jihadi (2) 21 9.5
Other (3) 5 2.3
Unknown (4) 27 12.2
Target
Business (0)1 53 24
Private Citizens & Property (1) 40 18
Religious Figures/Institutions (2) 29 13.1
Government (3) 24 10.9
Abortion Related (4) 22 10
Educational Institution (5) 16 7.2
Military (6) 7 3.2
Police (7) 7 3.2
Multiple/Other (8) 22 10
Unknown (9)2 1 0.5
Tactic
Facility/Infrastructure Attack (0)1 118 53.4
Bombing/Explosion (1) 49 22.2
Armed Assault (2) 39 17.6
Unarmed Assault (3) 12 5.4
Other (4) 3 1.4
Weapon
Incendiary (0)1 120 54.3
Explosive (1) 41 18.6
Firearms (2) 35 15.8
Other (3) 25 11.3
1 Reference category
2 Not included in analysis
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Procedure
For each incident, a search was conducted of the New York Times’ digital archive, 
accessed via an existing subscription. The search process was conducted according to 
procedures outlined by Chermak & Gruenwald (2006): it began by searching for articles 
within seven days of the incident using a relevant keyword such as “bomb” or 
“shooting.” Using the resulting articles as a starting point, the entire archive was then 
searched using the names of individuals, groups, and targets involved in the attack. 
Additional search criteria was gleaned from articles as necessary. 
Using this search process, a measure of the total number of articles on each 
incident and their total word count was obtained. These measures served as the dependent
variables for this study and included all articles that were focused on relaying specific 
details of the incident through all stages of the justice process. It did not include articles 
on other topics, such as policy or legislation, that referenced the incident.
Analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted using both R and the IBM Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) as appropriate. Following an initial descriptive analysis of 
the distribution of coverage, regression models were employed to determine which 
independent variables are predictors of both presence of coverage and amount of 
coverage. In addition, a qualitative analysis was conducted of the media frame 
surrounding the 10 most covered articles. This analysis focused on the specific elements 
that were prioritized in the coverage of the incidents and how the perpetrators and victims
were presented.
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Chapter 6: Findings
Distribution of Coverage
The New York Times included over 906 articles and more than 842,498 words on 
terrorist incidents. However, these articles only cover 63 (28.4%) of the incidents, a 
considerably smaller proportion than the 55.3% of incidents covered in the decades prior 
to 9/11 (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). 85% of incidents received less than 5 articles, 
and less than 1,500 words were written about 80% of incidents. Table 2 shows the 15 
most news producing incidents by word count in the sample. These cases accounted for 
79.5% of articles and 85% of words written on all incidents. 
Table 3 shows distribution of news coverage by incident characteristics. Many of 
these results are consistent with pre-9/11 research (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; 
Weimann & Brosius, 1991) as well as the hypotheses of this study.  Despite being in the 
minority, attacks that result in deaths or injuries were not only more likely to be covered, 
but also received increased attention when they were covered. This trend holds true for  
other variables as well: far left attacks, facility/infrastructure attacks, and attacks
Table 2. Fifteen most news producing terrorist incidents
Incident (Perpetrator) Year Articles Words
Anthrax Letters (Bruce Ivins) 2001 197 205,296
Boston Marathon Bombing (Dzokhar & Tamarlan Tsarnaev) 2013 169 151,173
Fort Hood Shooting (Nidal Hasan) 2009 94 85,079
Charleston Church Shooting (Dylann Roof) 2015 47 52,664
San Bernardino Shooting (Syed Farook & Tashfeen Malik) 2015 48 52,099
Underwear Bombing (Umar Abdulmutallab) 2009 42 38,809
NYC Police Shooting (Ismaaiyl Brinsley) 2014 17 20,255
Chattanooga Shootings (Muhammad Abdulazeez) 2015 16 19,338
Shooting of George Tiller (Scott Roeder) 2009 24 19,315
Planned Parenthood Shooting (Robert Dear) 2015 11 15,238
Sikh Temple Shooting (Wade Page) 2012 9 11,387
Riverside Police Shooting (Christopher Dorner) 2013 14 11,136
Curtis Cullwell Center Shooting (Elton Simpson & Nadir Soofi) 2015 11 11,045
Texas Fertilizer Plant Fire (Unknown) 2013 10 10,709
Chapel Hill Shooting (Craig Hicks) 2015 10 9,400
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Table 3. Mean number of articles and words by incident characteristic.
Variable Percent of incidents 
covered
Mean no. of articles Mean no. of 
words
Outcome
Successful1 30.1 4.53 4,262.04
Unsuccessful 21.6 2.03 1,542.92
Region
West1 14.9 1.13 1,054.91
South 51.9 5.25 4,625.21
Midwest 18.4 2.47 2,295.68
Northeast 42.3 8.42 7,473.88
Multiple 100 67.67 69,476
Seriousness – Deaths
No Deaths1 19 0.88 634.9
Deaths 96.3 27.19 26,463.19
Seriousness – Injuries
No Injuries1 20.6 1.14 934.37
Injuries 77.4 22.23 21,304.74
Origin
Domestic1 27.8 1.31 3,688.12
International 50 8.25 6,895
Apparent Motive
Far Left1 5.8 0.49 449.05
Far Right 40.7 2.53 2,257.89
Jihadi 66.7 20.29 18,335.14
Other 20 1.4 925.8
Unknown 37 8.29 8,421.03
Target
Business1 13.2 0.71 550
Private Citizens & Property 22.5 5.33 4,667.53
Religious Figures/Institutions 34.4 2.66 2,777.93
Government 58.3 4 3,527.83
Abortion Related 22.7 1.77 1,626.5
Educational Institution 0 0 0
Military 42.9 17 15,655.71
Police 71.4 6.71 6,162.43
Multiple/Other 45.5 12.5 12,156.95
Tactic
Facility/Infrastructure Attack1 10.2 0.34 249.39
Bombing/Explosion 22.5 5.76 5,244.24
Armed Assault 82.1 9.12 8,403.89
Unarmed Assault 0.5 18.17 18,121
Other 66.7 2.67 1,814
Weapon
Incendiary1 10 0.26 204.79
Explosive 26.8 6.78 6,241.24
Firearms 73.5 10.31 9,376.57
Other 41.7 9.75 9,516.5
1 Reference category
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 variables. When looking at which incidents receive the most attention, however, a shift 
from pre-9/11 priorities can be seen. Incidents with governmental targets are likely to 
receive at least some coverage, but receive less articles on average than other incidents. 
With regards to tactics, armed assaults received considerable amounts of attention. This is
not surprising when considering that the majority of the top news producing incidents are 
shootings. Unarmed assaults received high amounts of coverage on average, although the 
inclusion of the anthrax letters under the this category likely inflates this statistic to some 
degree.
Table 4 displays changes in both number of incidents and amount of coverage 
from year to year, beginning with 2002, the first full year in the sample. Much like pre-
9/11 coverage (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006), there is considerable variation in the 




















Increase (+) or decrease (-) or stay 
the same (~) from previous year?
2002 16 25 1.75 1,320.38
2003 31 9.7 0.38 217.7 + - - -
2004 8 0 0 0 - - - -
2005 20 10 .2 78.1 + + + +
2006 6 33.3 2 848.5 - + + +
2007 9 22.2 0.22 191.11 + - - -
2008 18 11.1 0.28 125.5 + - + -
2009 10 60 17 15,394.4 - + + +
2010 13 30.8 1.31 916.38 + - - -
2011 9 44.4 1.67 1,046.78 - + + +
2012 14 28.6 1.57 1,651.29 + - - +
2013 14 35.7 14.36 12,691.21 ~ + + +
2014 19 36.8 2.16 2,096.26 + + - -
2015 31 51.6 5.45 5,771.74 + + + +
POST-9/11 MEDIA COVERAGE OF TERRORISM 24
level of attention incidents receive over time. Terrorism enters the media spotlight 
suddenly, and leaves just as quickly. For   instance, note the changes from 2008 to 2010: 
percentage of coverage rises from 11% to 60% before falling back to 30%, with similarly 
drastic changes in amount of coverage. As was the case in pre-9/11 coverage, these shifts 
do not line up with changes in the number of incidents per year. In fact, number of 
incidents and levels of coverage move in opposite directions in many years.
Which incidents receive coverage?
To examine which factors influence whether the news media covers a given 
incident, two logistic regression models were estimated. The logistic coefficient, standard
error, significance level, and odds ratios are presented in Table 5. The Outcome, Region, 
Seriousness, Origin, Target, and Motive variables are included in both models, while 
Tactic and Motive are presented independently. This is due to concerns of 
multicolinierity: the Armed Assault (Tactic) and Firearms (Weapon) variables are 
strongly correlated (r = .840, p > .01). An examination of chi-square statistics shows that 
both models are significant (p < .001). Model 1 explained 49.4%  of the variance in 
coverage status, while Model 2 explained 48.2%.
Both models produced similar results.  As in pre-9/11 analyses (Chermak & 
Gruenewald, 2006; Weimann & Brosius, 1991), incidents were significantly more likely 
to receive coverage if they resulted in fatalities or injuries. Incidents with governmental 
targets were significantly more likely to be covered than incidents targeting businesses. 
Armed assaults were significantly more likely to receive coverage than facility and 
infrastructure attacks, and incidents using firearms were significantly more likely to 
receive coverage than incidents using incendiary devices.
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Table 5. Logistic regression analysis of coverage of terrorist incidents by characteristic
Logistic 
coefficient (B) Standard error Odds Ratio
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Outcome
Successful1 - - - - - -
Unsuccessful -1.392 -1.385 0.842 0.789 0.249 0.25
Region
West1 - - - - - -
South 1.123 1.199 0.654 0.631 3.073 3.317
Midwest 0.733 0.376 0.792 0.774 2.081 1.457
Northeast 1.164 1.206 0.753 0.737 3.204 3.341
Multiple 21.433 21.929 19,533.23 19348.793 2,032,823,553.859 3,340,818,727.127
Seriousness – Deaths
No Deaths1 - - - - - -
Deaths 2.913* 2.666* 1.293 1.321 18.717 14.377
Seriousness – Injuries
No Injuries1 - - - - - -
Injuries 2.088* 2.15* 0.893 0.917 8.068 8.583
Origin
Domestic1 - - - - - -
International -0.6 -0.541 1.717 1.711 0.549 0.582
Apparent Motive
Far Left1 - - - - - -
Far Right 2.068* 1.63 0.964 .879 7.909 5.106
Jihadi 2.896* 2.437 1.33 1.286 18.104 11.44
Other 0.999 0.529 2.353 2.351 2.715 1.697
Unknown 2.436* 1.738 1.078 0.960 11.426 5.69
Target
Business1 - - - - - -
Private Citizens & Property -1.197 -1.119 1.338 1.145 0.302 0.326
Religious Figures/Institutions 0.273 0.136 0.984 0.938 1.314 1.145
Government 2.542* 2.34* 1.091 0.95 12.699 10.38
Abortion Related 0.556 0.457 1.027 1.069 1.74 1.579
Educational Institution -20.118 -19.819 8,165.064 8,335.864 0 0
Military -2.159 -2.462 2.787 -2.528 0.115 0.085
Police 0.476 0.424 1.472 1.408 1.609 1.529
Other 3.980 0.708 0.993 0.973 2.533 2.031
Tactic
Facility/Infrastructure Attack1 - - - - - -
Bombing/Explosion 0.728 - 0.802 - 2.072 -
Armed Assault 1.855* - 0.826 - 6.394 -
Unarmed Assault 1.658 - 1.133 - 7.695 -
Other 2.867* - 1.766 - 53.526 -
Weapon
Incendiary1 - - - - - -
Explosive - 0.941 - 0.788 - 2.563
Firearms - 1.907* - 0.857 - 6.732
Other - 14.195 - 0.866 - 3.303
Constant -4.895*** -4.312*** 1.104 0.949 0.007 0.013
Note. Model 1: χ2=149.796***; Cox and Snell .494. Model 2: χ2=144.736***; Cox and Snell .482.
1Reference category.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Differences in coverage between levels of the Apparent Motive variable were only found 
in model 1. Incidents with far right, Jihadi, or unknown motivations were all more likely 
to receive coverage than far left incidents. Between these, Jihadi incidents have the 
highest odds ratio. 
How much coverage does an incident receive?
The nature of the dataset poses some problems when it comes to exploring the 
factors that impact the number of articles and word count of an incident. While ordinary 
least squares regression would normally be an appropriate statistical technique for 
handling continuous dependent variables, the results are highly sensitive to outliers 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In this regard, there are a number of problematic cases in 
this sample. Excluding them from analysis would allow for the use of OLS, but these 
cases are critical for understanding how the news covers terrorism. Instead, this study 
employed robust regression as an alternative to OLS, due to its ability to account for 
outliers by weighting cases based on their residuals (Holland & Welsch, 1977).
Robust regression was conducted for both sets of independent variables (outcome,
region, seriousness, origin, target, tactic;  outcome, region, seriousness, origin, motive, 
tactic) for each of three independent variables: number of articles, word count, and words
per article. The results of these 6 equations are presented in Table 6.
The results are largely consistent across models and are similar to the findings of 
the logistic regression presented previously. In all models, incidents occurring in the 
South showed increased of coverage compared to incidents occurring in the West. Both 
measures of seriousness were associated with increased media attention in all models, 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Outcome
Successful1 - - - - - -
Unsuccessful -0.032 -0.001 -56.348 -0.54.595 -1.834 -1.566
Region
West1 - - - - - -
South 0.107*** 0.003** 143.911*** 136.134*** 17.912*** 19.041***
Midwest 0.045 0.001 86.749* 59.141 6.194 4.957
Northeast 0.065 0.001 36.341 25.53 4.967 4.459
Multiple 4.069*** 5.001*** 2,536.882*** 2,662.459*** 252.333*** 274.174***
Seriousness – Deaths
No Deaths1 - - - - - -
Deaths 8.699*** 7.977*** 7,077.233*** 7,050.192*** 624.497*** 617.056***
Seriousness – Injuries
No Injuries1 - - - - - -
Injuries 1.081*** 1.024*** 499.054*** 491.856*** 136.586*** 136.159***
Origin
Domestic1 - - - - - -
International -0.225* -0.026*** -365.932** -466.852*** -24.391 -37.93**
Apparent Motive
Far Left1 - - - - - -
Far Right -0.045 -0.001 -118.221* -97.750 5.811 5.103
Jihadi 0.248** 0.026*** 358.375*** -518.720*** 14.903 33.552**
Other 0.098 0.021*** 189.413 230.104* -4.418 4.723
Unknown 0.043 0.001 95.7* 70.579 -7.254 7.849
Target
Business1 - - - - - -
Private Citizens & Property 0.01 0 -16.921 -18.633 -0.031 -1.076
Religious Figures/Institutions -0.007 0 54.515 36.57 -6.276 -6.617
Abortion Related 0.053 0.001 119.295 94.344 -6.669 -7.442
Government .717*** 0.974*** 261.809*** 410.937*** 245.772*** 252.651***
Educational Institution -0.038 -0.001 -50.12 -30.131 -6.152 -5.819
Military -0.033 -0.001 -102.676 -86.551 -14.602 -20.765
Police 0.554*** 0.973*** 131.18 127.165 -15.483 -8.526
Other 0.014 0.001 0.890 38.009 7.692 -7.486
Tactic
Facility/Infrastructure Attack1 - - - - -
Bombing/Explosion 0.014 - 24.45 - 2.745 -
Armed Assault 0.152** - 244.9*** - 236.355*** -
Unarmed Assault 1.015*** - 214.77* - 17.682 -
Other 0.899*** - 691.151*** - 632.825*** -
Weapon
Incendiary1 - - - - - -
Explosive - 0.001 - 1.297 - 0.793
Firearms - 0.999*** - 256.869** - 235.514***
Other - 0 - 15.023 - 1.747
Constant -0.021 0 -25.867 -11.075 -3.931 -2.356
1Reference category.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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although deaths had a stronger impact on coverage than injuries. On average, over 7,000 
more words and 8 more articles were written on incidents involving at least one death. 
Incidents of international origin received less attention than domestic incidents in most 
models (5/6 models). Jihadi incidents showed increased coverage compared to far left 
incidents in most models (5/6 models).  Incidents with governmental targets received 
increased coverage compared to incidents targeting businesses (all models)  as did in 
incidents targeting police (2/6 models).  Both armed assaults (all models) and unarmed 
assaults (2/3) models received more news space than facility/infrastructure attacks, and 
incidents involving firearms received more coverage than those involving incendiary 
devices in all models.
The Framing of the Incidents
Although these analyses tell us which incidents are included in the media frame, 
they tell us little about how the attacks are presented. To supplement these findings, a 
qualitative analysis was conducted of coverage of the incidents in Table 2.
Despite being one of the strongest predictors of coverage, slain victims were 
given minimal attention, with more focus on memorial services (e.g. Nir, 2014; Southall, 
2015) than on the victims themselves, although noteworthy victims such as George Tiller 
received additional focus (Barstow, 2009; Stumpe & Davey, 2009). Survivors received 
even less attention: unless they testified in court, they were generally out of focus. While 
there was some articles on the injuries sustained by survivors of the Boston Marathon 
bombing (Longman & Pilon, 2013; Louis, 2013), such coverage was the exception rather 
than the norm. Overall, articles on the perpetrators were given far more attention than 
victims, particularly for the most news producing incidents. 
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Perpetrator coverage was a major factor in differentiating the presentation of 
terrorism incidents. In incidents of Jihadi terrorism, coverage focused on the 
radicalization process, attempting to track the perpetrators exposure to a foreign ideology.
Foreign excursions of Tamarlan Tsarnaev and Mohammod Abdulazeez were analyzed to 
determine if they became radicalized overseas (Fahim, 2015; Schmidt & Barry, 2013), 
the Curtis Cullwell Center shooters were linked to ISIS via twitter (Callimachi, 2015), 
and both Nidal Hasan and Umar Abulmutallab were reported as having contact with the 
radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki (Erlanger, 2010; The New York Times, 2009).  Clear 
origins for radical ideologies were not always found, but : the radicalization San 
Bernadino shooters was not tied to any specific source, but the Times reported on signs 
that they had held their extreme ideology for quite some time prior to the attacks (A. N. 
Masood Salman & Schmidt, 2015; Turkewitz & Mueller, 2015), with particular focus 
given to Tashfeen Malik’s activities prior to entering the US (Hubbard, 2015; S. Masood 
& Walsh, 2015; Walsh, 2015). Overall, coverage of Jihadi incidents focused on possible 
external sources of radicalization rather than the personal histories of the perpetrators.
While some attention was given to the personal troubles of Islamic terrorists, they 
were presented as the motivation to explore Jihadi propaganda, not as the cause of the 
attack itself.  Mohammod Abdulazeez in particular was reported as being mentally ill, but
his trip to Jordan still factored prominently into the narrative, with stark changes noted in 
his behavior after his return (Schmitt & Pérez-peña, 2015).
In contrast, coverage of other perpetrators focused primarily on personal factors, 
with few attempt to tie ideological motivations to an external source. Although Dylann 
Roof was presented as a white supremacist (Horowitz & Dewan, 2015), his beliefs were 
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not explained by linking him to a larger movement. Instead, he was a troubled boy from a
broken home (Robles & Stewart, 2015) who produced a “rambling” (Sack & Blinder, 
2017) manifesto. Similarly, Robert Lewis Dear was “an angry and occasionally violent 
man who seemed deeply disturbed” (Fausset, 2015), and Craig Hicks was “the angry man
on Summerwalk Circle...  irritated about noise, irascible about parking, hostile to 
religion” (Katz & Paulson, 2015). Even when these perpetrators do have extremist ties, 
coverage focuses on their personal histories. Scott Roeder’s involvement with anti-
abortion groups and militias are presented not as the explanation for his actions but as 
part of a personal history that includes divorce, possible mental illness, and prior criminal
convictions (Saulny & Davey, 2009). Wade Page was heavily involved in the white 
supremacist subculture (Dao & Kovaleski, 2012), but the shooting itself was presented as
the culmination of a downward spiral after his girlfriend broke up with him two weeks 
before and he stopped showing up for work (Saulny & Davey, 2009).
Notably, coverage of the anthrax letters does not fit the same pattern as coverage 
of other incidents, as its presented as a public health issue as much as it is an act of 
terrorism. The Times tracked the spread of anthrax as it might track an infectious disease, 
reporting on closures of post offices and other facilities for testing and decontamination 
(e.g. Canedy & Firestone, 2001; Hanley, 2002). As the pool of victims expanded to 
include civilians, their private lives were analyzed to determine where they might have 
been exposed to the spores (Revkin, 2001; Zielbauer, 2001). The widespread 
contamination of the postal system created a level of fear and uncertainty unlike other 
incidents in the sample, and the extreme amounts of coverage the anthrax attacks 
received may be a result of factors unique to the incident.
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Chapter 7: Discussion
This study set out to explore the post-9/11 media framing of terrorism, contrasted 
with both pre-9/11 coverage and with actual attacks. Four hypotheses were proposed: that
the overall factors shaping post 9/11 coverage are the same as those shaping pre-9-11 
coverage; that within factors, the media prioritizes rarer types of incidents over more 
common ones; that the specific media priorities within factors have shifted since 9/11; 
and that the media prioritizes incidents with ties to international, Jihadi extremists.
The findings of this study support these hypotheses. Seriousness, target, tactic, 
and perpetrator identity, the primary factors shaping pre-9/11 coverage, were found to be 
just as influential in shaping post-9/11 coverage. Like pre-9/11 coverage, many factors 
follow a pattern in which less frequent types of incidents receive increased media 
attention. Attacks with deaths or injuries receive increased coverage despite being in the 
minority. Facility/infrastructure attacks and bombings receive less coverage than armed 
and unarmed assaults despite being more common. Far left and far right attacks receive 
less coverage than Jihadi attacks, and are less likely to be covered than even incidents 
with unknown motives.
Beyond these findings, there have been notable shifts from pre-9/11 coverage. 
Some types of attacks that received attention previously still receive attention: armed 
assaults with firearms and domestic attacks remain prominent. However, the changing 
nature of terrorism has necessitated shifts in coverage. Due to changes in airport security, 
the threat of hijackings and other attacks targeting airports have been greatly reduced, and
attention has shifted to more vulnerable government targets. Additionally, the Times no 
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longer shows a bias towards incidents in the Northeast. It is possible that an increased 
online presence has encouraged the Times to cater to a broader audience.
More striking than any differences within factors is changes in the overall pattern 
of coverage. Compared to Chermak’s (2006) analysis, the top 15 incidents account for an 
increased percentage of coverage, while a far greater portion of incidents receive no 
coverage at all. As a result, the most sensationalized incidents have an even greater 
impact on the media frame than they did prior to 9/11.
As hypothesized, Jihadi incidents are disproportionately represented in the media 
frame. Although this does not translate to increased coverage of international incidents, 
qualitative analysis of the top 15 incidents suggests that there is an attempt to treat Jihadi 
extremists as international regardless of their actual origin, as suggested by prior 
analyses(Powell, 2011). While coverage of other forms of terrorism focuses on personal 
causes, assuming it discusses motive at all, coverage of Jihadi incidents focuses 
extensively on external sources of radicalization. Not only does this link the perpetrators 
to foreign extremists, it arguably shifts the blame away from the perpetrator to the 
ideology, to some extent.
Overall, the post-9/11 media framing of terrorism is not a dramatic shift from the 
pre-9/11 media frame. Rather, it is a stronger presentation of the same frame. It gives the 
most prominence to incidents that do not reflect the reality of terrorism, while ignoring 
typical cases of terrorism entirely. It presents a form of terrorism that is bloody, personal, 
and Islamic. It creates an idea of terrorism that includes mass shootings in broad daylight,
but not arson in the middle of the night. It ties homegrown extremists to foreign sources 
of radicalization, creating the impression that the threat is external. Such coverage 
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inspires public fears that are not grounded in reality, and policy designed to quell these 
fears will inevitably fail to address the real problems of terrorism.
The findings of this study are important contributions to the body of research on 
the presentation of terrorism in the news, but there are a number of significant questions 
that still need to be addressed. In particular, these findings should be supplemented with 
analyses more conservative outlets, such as the Washington Post, and with analyses of 
televised news sources. In addition, there are a number of questions that can be explored 
on the impact of specific choices the media makes in its coverage of terrorism. What is 
the impact of perpetrator-centric coverage compared to victim-centric coverage? How 
does an emphasis on external sources of radicalization shape perception of the 
perpetrator? Studies addressing these questions will provide further understanding of both
the content and impact of the media’s framing of terrorism.
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